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 Non-technical summary  
 
Motivated by the current discussion on different separate banking systems, we provide an 
overview of the different systems, question them and outline their effect on systemic stability 
and the German banking sector. The results show that the various separate banking systems 
only play a minor role in reducing and limiting systemic risk. They only marginally contribute 
to solving conflicts of interest and can even be detrimental to banking business diversifica-
tion. A separate banking system could, however, facilitate banking supervision by reducing 
the banking system’s complexity. Furthermore, credible threats to not support investment 
banks with federal resources in times of crisis could lead to a more adequate incentives struc-
ture of suppliers of equity and outside capital. More efficient measures to further reduce sys-
temic risk in the financial sector should, however, use different levers, such as additional min-
imum regulatory capital requirements. 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze  
 
Ziel unserer Studie ist es, ein umfassendes Bild über die derzeit diskutierten verschiedenen 
Trennbankensysteme zu liefern, die bestehenden Überlegungen kritisch zu hinterfragen und 
Folgen einer möglichen Umsetzung in Bezug auf die Systemstabilität sowie Bankenstruktur 
in Deutschland aufzuzeigen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die unterschiedlichen Trennbanken-
systeme nur einen eher untergeordneten Beitrag zur Reduktion und Begrenzung von System-
risiko leisten können. Für die Lösung von Interessenkonflikten scheinen sie keinen signifikan-
ten Beitrag zu leisten und hinsichtlich der Diversifikation des Bankgeschäfts könnten sie so-
gar nachteilig sein. Ein Trennbankensystem könnte allerdings die Bankenaufsicht durch die 
Reduktion der Komplexität des Bankensystems etwas einfacher machen. Außerdem könnte 
die glaubhafte Drohung, die Investmentbanken im Falle einer Krise nicht durch staatliche 
Zuschüsse zu unterstützen, zu einer ökonomisch adäquateren Anreizstruktur der Eigen- und 
Fremdkapitalgeber führen. Effiziente Maßnahmen zur weiteren Reduktion des Systemrisikos 
im Finanzsektor sollten aber besser an anderen Hebeln ansetzen, wie etwa zusätzlichen Erfor-
dernissen hinsichtlich des regulatorischen Mindesteigenkapitals. 
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1 Introduction 
The current discussion about restructuring the European banking sector is centred 
around the introduction of a separate, specialist banking system. The most prominent contri-
bution to this discussion is the European Commission’s Expert Group on Reforming the 
Structure of the EU Banking Sector, whose report was published in October 2012 (Liikanen et 
al. (2012)). The overarching goals of introducing a separate banking system are a more stable 
financial system, an increase in the security of deposits and a reduction of public financial 
support needed to stabilise financial institutions. These goals were motivated by the develop-
ments of the financial crisis in the late 2000s. In a separate banking system, the particularly 
risky investment banking activities are separated from the other business areas of a universal 
bank (particularly from deposit banking, payment transactions and lending to individuals as 
well as businesses) and are assigned to a separate investment bank. This is designed to create 
two largely separate banking cycles. According to the Liikanen Report, both retail and in-
vestment banks will have to comply with regulatory capital requirements. In a separate sys-
tem, however, investment banks would no longer be able to benefit (directly or indirectly) 
from the retail bank’s deposit banking business. A potential advantage concerning refinancing 
costs, namely a lower risk premium due to possible government intervention in times of crisis, 
would also be eliminated. After all, investment banks, as opposed to retail banks, are to re-
ceive no or only very limited government support during a financial crisis. 
The idea of two separate banking cycles is not recent. In 1933, the US introduced a sep-
arate, specialist banking system through the Glass-Steagall Act, in response to the Great De-
pression. It was designed to avoid conflicts of interest between different banking activities of 
a universal bank and thus to protect customers. This banking system was watered down over 
the years and finally resolved in the 1990s. Beforehand, influential studies had documented 
that the danger stemming from conflicts of interest in universal banks had been overestimated 
in the 1920s (Kroszner/Rajan (1994), White (1986)). Studies on the period after 1987, when 
important deregulation measures were taken, reach similar conclusions (e.g., Gande et 
al. (1997), Gande et al. (1999), Mullineaux (2002), Focarelli et al. (2011)). 
The aim of our study is to provide a comprehensive overview of the different separation 
approaches currently discussed, to question existing ideas and to present the repercussions of 
a separation for the German banking system and the stability of the banking sector.  
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The analysis is structured as follows. Chapter II describes and discusses current pro-
posals for the introduction of a specialist banking system. Building up on this, in Chapter III, 
we discuss the repercussions of the introduction of such a system for Germany and analyse 
whether a separate banking system can improve the stability of the banking sector in general. 
Chapter IV concludes. 
 
2 Overview of the Current Reform Proposals 
The introduction and design of a separate banking system is the topic of public and aca-
demic debate. Two options are already being implemented: the so-called Volcker Rule (in-
cluded in the Dodd Frank Act) in the US and the proposals by the Vickers Commission in the 
UK. The latter is based on a 2009 OECD proposal, which is centred on so-called Non-
Operating Holding Company Structures (NOHC). This approach has also been considered by 
the Liikanen Report. The current approaches will be discussed in this chapter. 
2.1 OECD proposal3 
In 2009, OECD researchers Blundell-Wignall et al. (2009) published a proposal to cre-
ate a non-operating holding company (NOHC) structure for banks. They analysed whether a 
restructuring was necessary, and if so in what way, to stabilise the banking sector, especially 
with an eye to the too-big-to-fail issue. The authors come to the conclusion that the proposals 
on a financial market reform collated by the G-20 at the 2009 financial summit in Pittsburgh 
and designed to increase financial market stability (esp. Basel III) are not sufficient. An 
NOHC structure proposes the operative separation of individual business areas of a (univer-
sal) bank under one umbrella company. Each legally independent entity has its own capital 
base which is a priori non-transferrable between the entities. Only the umbrella company is 
entitled to borrow on the capital market and can then invest these resources in the different 
entities, but it is not entitled to pursue banking activities itself. Excluding customer deposits 
from liability for losses of the investment bank addresses the too-big-to-fail problem. This 
type of separation would also facilitate the liquidation of an insolvent business branch. Each 
                                                 
3 The proposal by German candidate for the chancellorship, SPD’s Peer Steinbrück on the introduction of a sepa-




business unit has to develop its own “living will” for a potential insolvency and joint and sev-
eral liability among the separated business units is excluded. 
This means that there shall be no intermeshing of staff that could water down the sepa-
ration, so that every entity has its own board of management, supervisory board and reporting. 
Despite a complete legal separation, the holding company is allowed to fulfil tasks (e.g. IT 
and Marketing) which may be used by all entities in order to create economies of scale and 
scope. 
2.2 Vickers Commission and White Paper 
In June 2010, the UK government set up the Independent Commission on Banking 
(ICB) chaired by the former Governor of the Bank of England, Sir John Vickers. The Com-
mission’s goal was to create a stable and efficient banking system and secure people’s savings 
deposits. To achieve this goal, business units handling deposits were to be strictly shielded 
from other banking areas (“ring fencing”). The proposal was published in late 2011 and 
served as the basis for a draft law published by the UK government in June 2012 as a White 
Paper. The White Paper included many of the recommendations made by the Commission. 
The government seeks to pass this law by the end of the current legislature in May 2015 and 
fully implement it by 2019. The draft law calls for a ring fence between the economically rel-
evant banking areas – traditional retail banking with deposit banking and lending – and the 
areas that are less important for the whole economy. Passing through losses in the investment 
banking branch to retail banking would thus become impossible. Client deposits under a cer-
tain threshold are to be assigned to the separated business unit (White Paper (2012)).4 
The Vickers Commission categorises financial services as: (1) exclusively permissible 
for ring-fenced banks, (2) prohibited for ring-fenced banks, and (3) permitted financial ser-
vices which may be offered by ring-fenced banks (Sachverständigenrat (2011), p. 161). The 
White Paper (2012) stipulates the following rules for ring-fenced banks: 
1. Higher capital requirements apply in a ring fence than for other banking activities. A tier-1 
capital ratio of 10 to 13% is planned, as well as an overall capital ratio (tiers 1 and 2) of up 
to 17% for systemically important banks (SIBs). Outside of the ring fence, the – lower – 
Basel III requirements apply. 
                                                 
4 The threshold has yet to be determined, but thresholds from 250,000 to 750,000 GBP are being discussed. The 
same holds true for company deposits. Their threshold may be set between 6.5 and 25 million GBP (White 
Paper (2012)). 
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2. The leverage ratio5 is set at 3%, acknowledging the respective Basel III criteria as suffi-
cient. 
3. Lending to other banks or financial institutions outside of the ring fence (e.g. insurers) is 
prohibited. 
4. Transactions between the ring-fenced entity and the remaining financial institutions are 
limited and have to be treated as business with third parties in terms of risk management 
and financial supervision. 
5. Financial services for clients outside of the European Economic Area (EEA) may not be 
carried out. 
As in the OECD structure, the two business areas are to be separated legally, i.e. each 
entity has to set up its own reporting, board of management and supervisory board. In contrast 
to the fixed capital base, the entities may transfer capital between the different business areas, 
as long as each entity complies with its specific capital requirements. These measures are 
planned to enter into force in 2019. Therefore, its effects will only become visible later on. 
Discussions on Vickers and the White Paper 
There have been mixed responses from the UK financial industry. Some assume that di-
versification stemming from different business areas may decrease and thus make the overall 
banking business riskier. On the other hand, such a law is not expected to make banks and 
other financial institutions leave the financial centre of London, as the investment industry 
there would not be regulated more strictly than in other financial centres.6 
In terms of higher capital requirements, The Economist (2011) sees similarities between 
the Vickers Commission’s proposal and the Swiss banking reform, which prescribes a capital 
ratio of 19%. Chow/Surti (2011) see difficulties in defining “economically important” bank-
ing activities. The authors also doubt whether ring-fencing is sufficient to minimise contagion 
risk. In its annual report 2011/2012, the Sachverständigenrat (2011) (German expert advisory 
council) for the assessment of the German economic development criticises that the Vickers 
Commission’s proposal might have an adverse effect on international reform efforts towards a 
uniform prudential supervision through a “geographic splitting of financial institutions”. This 
                                                 
5 The leverage ratio is essentially the ratio between tier-1 capital to the bank’s non-risk-weighted assets. 
6 A Financial Times (2011) article assumes that the location choice for financial activities is made first and 
foremost based on long-term business strategies and that, therefore, a more profound change in business mod-
els would have to take place to motivate a change in location. This assumption meets the results of Lang 
(2012), who analyses determinants of location attractiveness of financial centres. 
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is because according to the Vickers Report, only private customers located in the UK have to 
be ring-fenced; for all other clients in the European Economic Area, ring-fencing is merely an 
option. Therefore, retail banks outside of the EEA can also remain outside of the ring fence. 
The Vickers Commission therefore hampers global efforts to create a supranational superviso-
ry authority (Sachverständigenrat (2011)). 
2.3 Volcker Rule  
The Volcker Rule is part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Acts and was signed into law by US President Obama in late July 2010. It was supposed 
to enter into force by July 2012, but has not yet done so due to politically motivated delays.7 
Other parts of the Dodd-Frank Act have been successfully put into practice.8 According to this 
proposal, banks with deposit business are subject to further regulations. Compliance with 
these regulations is a prerequisite for inclusion into the federal deposit insurance scheme 
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).9 For business operations, this means: (1) a prohibi-
tion of short-term proprietary trading, (2) a limit on investments in assets defined as “risky” 
and (3) a restriction of mergers (see Dodd-Frank-Act (2010), Sec. 619): 
1. ”Short-term“ is defined as a holding period of less than 60 days. Proprietary trading with 
US bonds or bonds of companies or institutes with close links to the government is not 
subject to this prohibition. Providing liquidity for customers (market-making) and hedging 
are permitted. 
2. Assets considered to be “very risky“ are private equity funds and hedge funds. In order to 
limit funds financed by banks, banks may only hold a maximum of 3% of fund volume and 
may only invest a maximum of 3% of their tier-1 capital in such financial instruments. 
3. Mergers which would result in a retail bank with a total balance of more than 10% of the 
aggregate US banking market are prohibited.  
Discussions on the Volcker Rule 
Chow/Surti (2011) fear the rise of problems for the regulatory categorisation of business 
areas. According to the authors, the definition of permitted hedging activities is too vague, 
making it almost impossible to distinguish these from prohibited activities. The authors also 
                                                 
7 In early 2012, the FED published a statement saying the Volcker Rule was not properly thought out. The defi-
nition of prohibited banking activities was seen as a particularly big issue (see Tarullo (2012)). 
8 Two examples are the introduction of a new supervisory authority for financial services or the new federal 
institution for customer protection (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)). 
9 This also applies to foreign entities who accept deposits in the US. 
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fear a potential shift of risks to shadow banks, where they would be difficult to monitor. 
However, new laws and regulations will take years to show their effect even after complete 
implementation, due to the high number of transition periods of up to 144 months (Liikanen 
(2012)). These transition periods are conditional on the size of a bank and its involvement in 
risky assets. Larger banks are granted longer transition periods. Another point of critique is 
that the Volcker Rule could limit companies’ supply of capital market products and render 
market making more expensive (e.g. Duffie (2012)). EU Commissioner Barnier points out a 
potential drop in demand for European government bonds due to restricted proprietary trading 
under the Volcker Rule. This could intensify the debt crisis of the affected European countries 
(Wall Street Journal (2012)).  
The Volcker Rule does create new requirements for mergers in order to limit the size of 
individual banks relative to the financial system. However, the intended cluster risk reduction 
only applies to new cases and does not affect the size of existing financial institutions. The 
Volcker Rule does not limit business activities of financial services providers that have a dif-
ferent legal form than banks, which could be an advantage for insurance companies and pri-
vate equity firms (The Economist (2010)). 
2.4 The Liikanen Report 
When the ICB’s detailed proposal and the introduction of the Volcker Rule in the US 
took shape, the EU Commission for the Internal Market and Services instructed an Expert 
Group (“Liikanen Group”) in early 2012 to find a solution tailored to the needs of the EU. In 
early October 2012, the Liikanen Group submitted its final report. Similar to Altunbas et al. 
(2011), they found that “no particular business model fared particularly well, or particularly 
poorly in the financial crisis” (Liikanen et al. (2012), p. 99). Instead, the Liikanen Group 
found that the causes of the financial crisis were “excessive risk-taking – often in trading 
highly-complex instruments [. . .] – and excessive reliance on short-term funding” (Liikanen 
et al. (2012), p. 99). 
In order to counteract these developments, the framework set by Basel III and CRD 
III/IV are to be supported by stricter capital and risk management requirements. Furthermore, 
the expert group proposes to make efficient consolidation plans compulsory, to introduce 
“bail-in” instruments10 for a stronger loss share of private investors, as well as to secure prop-
erty investments with more capital. In addition, supervisory authorities are to be strengthened 
by easier supervision, stricter risk management regulations, and the introduction of effective 
                                                 
10 A „bail-in“ instrument triggers the conversion of debt into equity in a previously defined crisis scenario.  
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sanctions. The rules governing the payment of bankers should furthermore be tightened. The 
greater share of variable pay stipulated by CRD III is to include more “bail-in” instruments so 
that the management has a share in losses. This is considered a crucial step in building up the 
public’s confidence in a just financial system. The group of authors in Liikanen et al. (2012) 
comes to the conclusion that separating risky trading activities in a separate banking unit (“in-
vestment bank”) is necessary to guarantee financial stability. The Liikanen Group proposes 
two alternative ways to separate commercial and investment banks: 
Avenue 1 
This option calls for the introduction of an additional, non-risk-weighted capital buffer 
for all banks whose investment activities exceed a certain threshold. The dimensions of this 
buffer depend on the volume of trade activities. A higher capital buffer is also considered for 
banks with a high share of deposit financing in order to further protect retail banks from the 
higher risk incurred from investment banking activities. In a second step, these banks’ “re-
structuring and liquidation plans” have to be scrutinised by the supervisory authorities. In 
these plans, banks are to explain how they would prevent losses in the investment branch 
from spilling over to the retail branch (this corresponds to the OECD proposal’s “living will”) 
in case of a crisis. If the supervisory authorities deem the banks’ plans to be insufficient, a 
legal separation of investment banking from retail banking becomes compulsory. This scruti-
nization basically requires a banking union with the same supervisory rules across countries 
(level playing field). Otherwise, there would be national incentives to treat this issue differ-
ently, which could lead to differences in the attractiveness of location (see Lang (2012)). 
As in the OECD proposal, a separation of banking units makes it impossible to finance 
investment banking with deposits or to move capital between the two entities (Blundell-
Wingall et al. (2009)).  
Avenue 2 
This approach does not require previous scrutinization by the supervisory authorities for 
a separation of investment activities. Rather, exceeding a certain numerical threshold for a 
bank’s investment business calls for a separation. The Liikanen Report discusses both a com-
plete separation of investment activities and the option to only separate the volume exceeding 
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the threshold.11 As in Avenue 1, the bank will be separated into two legally independent bank-
ing units, which, similar to the British system, have to have their own management and re-
porting and which are not allowed to transfer capital between each other. One exception is a 
retail bank in distress. Here, the investment unit can help out with capital. However, capital 
requirements have to be observed, which require an additional capital buffer for the invest-
ment unit (as in Avenue 1). Furthermore, retail banking entities are not allowed to be owner 
or property of an internal or external investment banking unit. 
In both Avenues, the Liikanen Group proposes these numerical thresholds: Investment 
activities must not exceed (1) a volume of 15 to 25% of the total balance sheet or (2) a total 
maximum value of 100 billion euro. 
According to Liikanen not all investment banking activities are affected by a separation 
but only the riskiest. Particularly proprietary trading with securities and derivatives and other 
activities in the securities and derivatives markets are to be separated. The latter affects all 
trading positions in market making. Trading activities within a bank’s own asset and liability 
management are an exception. The report lists further activities that should be part of a sepa-
rate investment unit,12 as well as those which should continue to be allowed in the remaining 
banking unit, but which have to be restricted nonetheless.13 
If the supervisory authorities require a splitting of the bank, the two resulting units can 
continue operation as two legally independent entities or can be bundled underneath the um-
brella of a holding (NOHC structure). Bundling can evoke economies of scale and scope. 
However, defining numerical thresholds will be very difficult and require continuous scrutini-
zation. The Liikanen Group assumes that refinancing banks will become more costly, which 
could in turn, together with less diversification options, make banking products more expen-
sive. 
Discussion on the Liikanen proposal 
One may assume that defining thresholds for the permitted share of investment activi-
ties may be an incentive for banks to fulfil the (same) return expectations with riskier activi-
                                                 
11 See Liikanen et al. ((2012), p. 98). The latter option is designed to consider diversification benefits. However, 
whether a separation of only those investment activities exceeding the threshold can result in an independent, 
surviving entity is doubtful.  
12 Loans and brokerage for hedge funds, off-balance-sheet business and investments in private equity.  
13 Lending business with companies, foreign trade financing, consumer credit business, mortgages, inter-bank 
loans, shares in loan syndication, securitization concerning refinancing, wealth management and asset man-
agement, as well as arrangements with money market funds. 
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ties. This means a bank could stay below the threshold but yield an average return which, be-
fore, it was only able to reach by exceeding the threshold. 
Avenue 1 especially leaves room for interpretation and therefore uncertainties for banks 
concerning their business model. These uncertainties firstly affect the supervisory authority 
responsible for the scrutinization of restructuring and liquidation plans of banks with a signif-
icant commercial business. The wording of the Liikanen Report suggests concessions to the 
status quo: Scrutinization is carried out by the responsible supervisory authority according to 
EU-wide parameters. However, the Report’s own discussion of the proposal already suggests 
that a uniform supervisory framework in the Eurozone with a central supervisory authority is 
essential. Major uncertainties also arise because the criteria for the assessment of restructuring 
and liquidation plans are not specified in more detail. The Liikanen Report only mentions that 
the risk positions should be assessed with a view to market size and that the complexity of 
trade instruments and organisational structures of a bank have to be considered.14 
The public has often applauded the Liikanen Group’s approaches because they facilitate 
the monitoring of large, complex universal banks as well as their liquidation in times of crisis. 
However, the thresholds (15-25% of the total balance sheet or 100 billion euros) are viewed 
as too high, as only few banks would fall into that category (e.g. Financial Times (2012)). The 
Economist (2012) detects good points in the Report but criticises that it focuses too strongly 
on risky banking activities which are to be separated rather than identifying those business 
activities that are relevant for the real economy and should therefore be protected. Many in-
dustry representatives have welcomed the Liikanen Report and praise its consideration of the 
needs of banks and the advantages of a universal banking system (Bloomberg (2012)). The 
rating agency Fitch favours the idea of securing property investments with more capital in 
order to limit potential losses in this sector (Reuters (2012)). British business lawyers criticise 
the Liikanen Report’s deviation from the White Paper (2012). British banks would have to 
comply with both, which would entail a considerable legal effort (e.g., McNulty (2012)). 
 
                                                 
14 „The triggers would be related to the scale of the risk positions and their relation to market size, as large posi-
tions are difficult to wind down, particularly in a market stress situation. The triggers would also be related to 
the complexity of the trading instruments and organization (governance and legal structure) of the trading ac-
tivities, as these features materially affect the resolvability of trading operations“ (Liikanen et al. (2012), p. 
96). 
10 
3 Effects of the Proposals 
3.1 Effects of a separate banking system on the stability of the banking sector 
Investment banks are spun off so that, in a financial crisis, the taxpayer only has to pay 
for saving (part of) the retail banks, while investment banks, which are deemed economically 
less important can go bankrupt.15  Suppliers of equity and debt capital to investment banks 
could thus lose their entire capital invested. The risk premia they demand should rise accord-
ingly. The higher price for capital should, ceteris paribus, lead to a slower growth of the in-
vestment banking unit. 
A further advantage of a separate banking system as pointed out by the Liikanen Report 
is that the banking system’s structure becomes less complex and that higher transparency 
makes banking supervision easier. These arguments support the introduction of a separate 
banking system in order to stabilise the banking sector. Empirical research is less conclusive, 
but there are indications that universal banks with a relatively low share in investment bank-
ing are less prone to crises than their alternative of pure investment and retail banks. 
There is clear evidence from research that investment banking is a particularly risky part 
of the banking business (see e.g. Demirgüc-Kunt/Huizinga (2010)). All empirical studies in-
cluded in the following part of this chapter agree on this topic.   
Adams et al. (2010) reach the conclusion that significantly negative effects could origi-
nate in hedge funds in times of crisis, which could move from investment banks (as the 
transmission channel) to retail banks and even the insurance sector.16 The study identifies 
hedge funds as one of the central risk factors for systemic crises and shows that investment 
banks would be adversely affected by them but could also function as transmission channel to 
other areas of the financial sector. The results of the study could be interpreted as that a sepa-
ration of investment banks from retail banks and insurers could significantly reduce the sys-
temic risk stemming from hedge funds. A separate banking system would leave most of the 
risk stemming from hedge funds in investment banks. 
                                                 
15 The Sachverständigenrat ((2011), p. 161-162) voices its doubts about this in its brief analysis of separate 
banking systems based on the Vickers Report. It assumes that the threat of not providing government means 
to rescue investment banks in times of crisis will be difficult to put into practice. The prevention of a system-
wide domino effect in the banking sector by ring-fencing banks is also deemed improbable.   
16 The study analyses the US financial sector and uses daily data for the period from April 2003 to the end of 
2009. The results are confirmed by Schröder et al. ((2011), Chapter 3.4) for the extended period until Decem-
ber 31, 2010. 
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Some studies have analysed the difference in returns and risk between various banking 
business models. Among other things, they address the question of whether, and in how far a 
“mix” of investment banking and retail banking would be sensible. 
A relatively early study is that of Templeton/Severiens (1992). The authors analyse how 
different diversifications of the banking business affect US banks’ share prices between 1979 
and 1986. They find that business diversification made banks more stable in terms of less 
share price volatility. However, this is only an indirect result for the analysis of diversification 
benefits, because share prices serve as reference point, as opposed to a bank’s success. 
De Nicolo et al. (2004) find that banks with a broader services spectrum are subject to 
greater risk. The study is based on data on 500 financial institutions worldwide and analyses 
the time period from 1995 until 2000. The authors argue that larger banks with a wider range 
of services (universal banks) are willing to incur higher risks than smaller, specialised finan-
cial institutions and thus over-compensate potential diversification benefits. 
Demirgüc-Kunt/Huizinga (2010) analyse 1,334 banks from 101 countries for the time 
from 1995 to 2007. They divide banking activities into interest business and all other business 
areas (non-interest business)17 and analyse the effects of the business model on return and risk. 
Their main finding is that a small share in investment banking activities (characterised by an 
emphasis on “non-interest business” and a larger share in short-term financing through the 
capital market) generates diversification benefits in the business model.18  
Altunbas et al. (2011) analyse the effect of certain pre-crisis characteristics of banks on 
risk realised during the crisis. They analysed 1,100 banks in Europe and the United States. 
Characteristics such as size, equity, volume of loans granted, and financing structure were 
collated for the period of late 2003 to the third quarter of 2007. For the time of the financial 
crisis, from the end of 2007 until the end of 2009, measures for risk susceptibility of banks 
were calculated, such as the risk of bankruptcy and the amount of liquidity provided by the 
central bank. Altunbas et al. show that the size of a bank, relatively little equity, strong credit 
growth and little deposit funding lead to higher risk. The effect of the business model on risk 
seems to be non-linear: a greater share of deposit funding (and therefore a lower share in 
short-term capital market financing) lowers the risk of particularly risky banks disproportion-
ately. In less risky banks, however, an increase in short-term capital market financing does 
not immediately lead to a significant risk increase. When applied to separate banking systems, 
                                                 
17 „Non-interest business“ includes as main parts commission business and proprietary trading. 
18 Diversification benefit denominates the idea, in portfolio theory, that higher returns can be generated at the 
same risk or the same return can be generated at a lower risk. 
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the results of this study find that a small investment banking unit only marginally increases 
the overall risk of a low-risk retail bank. A split-up into retail and investment bank would 
therefore not be necessary for such banks. 
Beltratti/Stulz (2012) analyse which banks were particularly affected by the financial 
crisis. Their study was conducted on about 220 large international banks from mid-2007 until 
late 2008. Banks with an ex ante high equity ratio, a high share of deposit funding and a focus 
on credit business were found to have performed relatively well. This study underlines the 
particular robustness of retail banks with a small share in investment banking. 
While Demirgüc-Kunt/Huizinga (2010); Altunbas et al. (2011) and Beltratti/Stulz 
(2012) focus on large listed banks, Köhler (2012) also analyses smaller, non-listed banks and 
considers around 3,000 retail banks, savings banks and cooperative banks in 15 EU Member 
States over the period from 2003 until 2009.19 Similar to Altunbas et al. (2011), the study 
analyses influencing factors of banking risk. One of the main influencing factors is strong 
credit growth; the type of financing (capital market vs. deposits) does not seem to play an 
important role. An increase in non-interest business even lowers risk through a greater diver-
sification of sources of income. This effect appears to be particularly strong in smaller banks. 
The author reasons that larger banks have more possibilities to carry out risky activities in 
non-interest business, which counter diversification benefits.20 
The abovementioned empirical studies elaborate extensive implications for banking 
regulation and supervision: 
- A relatively low participation in investment banking activities improves the risk-
return ratio of universal banks (see Demirgüc-Kunt/Huizinga (2010)). 
- However, there are indications that banks with a wider range of services tend to 
run higher risks and could thus over-compensate diversification benefits (see De 
Nicolo et al. (2004)). 
- A low participation in investment banking will only marginally increase the 
overall risk of retail banks which are managed in a low-risk manner (see Altun-
bas et al. (2011)). A strict separation into retail bank and investment bank would 
therefore not be necessary for such banks. 
- An increase in investment banking activity (non-interest business) in relatively 
small banks could even lower risk through greater diversification of sources of 
                                                 
19 Köhler does not include investment banks. 
20 Such as risky off-balance sheet activities, proprietary trading. 
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income, while this connection cannot be found in large banks (see Köhler 
(2012)). 
- A main source of systemic risk in the financial sector seems to be hedge funds. 
Investment banks serve as a transmission channel for risks to other areas of the 
financial sector (retail banks, insurance companies) (see Adams et al. (2010)). 
These results rather speak against the introduction of a pure separate banking system, 
but in favour of strictly limiting the influence of investment banking on the universal bank. 
The Liikanen Report’s Avenue 2 takes account of this fact by proposing a compulsory separa-
tion into investment bank and retail bank only above a threshold of 15 to 25% (Liikanen et al. 
((2012), p.101)). This would permit a significant participation in investment banking without 
requiring a separate investment bank. However, under Avenue 2, a positive diversification 
effect would almost be eliminated after a complete separation of the investment bank.21 A 
possible consequence is reduced stability for both retail bank and investment bank. 
This supports the introduction of Avenue 1 in combination with a stricter limit on a 
bank’s share in investment banking. However, the Liikanen Report does not make clear sug-
gestions for the allocation of banking activities to the two separated entities. According to 
Liikanen et al. ((2012), p.98), it would be possible to only transfer those investment activities 
to the investment banking unit which exceed the 15-25% threshold. This would at least con-
stitute a diversification advantage for the retail bank. 
Empirical studies such as Altunbas et al. (2011) and Köhler (2012) use their empirical 
findings to argue that the main factors for systemic risk are strong credit growth, insufficient 
equity and a large share of short-term capital market financing. These risk factors are already 
considered in the new Basel III regulations, e.g. through the introduction of higher regulatory 
capital requirements, the anti-cyclical capital buffer or the minimum liquidity requirement. 
The discussion on separate banking systems does not significantly touch upon these main risk 
factors and therefore seems to not play a central role in the debate on how to reduce systemic 
risk. 
3.2 Effects on the German banking structure 
Under the Volcker Rule, banks wishing to continue using the deposit-guarantee scheme 
and access to central bank resources have to either legally separate their investment business 
                                                 
21 Diversification benefits could still arise in this case because not all investment banking activities have to be 
transferred to the investment bank. According to the Liikanen Report, proprietary trading and other trading 
activities are to be transferred while M&A business, which is not systemically important, may remain in the 
retail bank. 
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or limit its operation in compliance with regulation. Since customer investments continue to 
be permitted, however, they would still be able to offer a wide range of products without a 
spin-off of their investment banking unit. Nevertheless, the Volcker Rule has to be viewed as 
a solution tailored to the needs of the US banking market, which could lead to distortions of 
various magnitudes in different banking systems. Introducing the Volcker Rule would not 
entail a great change for savings banks and regional banks (Landesbanken), since savings 
banks do not participate in business of risky assets and are not permitted to act outside of the 
savings bank sector (Becker/Peppmeier (2011), p. 86). Savings banks and regional banks are 
not part of the national deposit-guarantee schemes, but secure their customers’ deposits 
through institutional guarantee and savings bank support funds (Sparkassenstützungsfonds). 
Should the exclusion from deposit-guarantee schemes of institutions active in short-term pro-
prietary trading be transferred to these support instruments, and should regulations on central 
bank funds come into force, regional banks would have to adjust their business according to 
the regulations. Since customer-induced short-term proprietary trading is permitted under the 
Volcker Rule, regional banks could still offer a wide range of products for corporate custom-
ers. Cooperation between savings banks and regional banks in an association is not affected. 
Vickers could pose a problem for the German public banking sector. An issue for coop-
eration between savings banks and regional banks could be the prohibition of transactions 
between the ring-fenced entities (savings banks) and the non-ring-fenced entities (regional 
banks and DekaBank). According to the regulations, the ring-fenced retail units would not be 
allowed to grant loans to or participate in non-ring-fenced financial institutions. Furthermore, 
savings banks would have to comply with the additional capital requirements. 
Those proposals calling for a separation of the two business units under the umbrella of 
a holding (OECD, Steinbrück, Liikanen) should only apply to large German banks (such as 
Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, LBBW). This should reduce the then-costly proprietary trad-
ing. In particular, refinancing the investment banking unit is expected to become much more 
expensive. The original OECD proposal should constitute a feasible model for savings banks 
and regional banks, since it largely corresponds to the existing structures in the sector. The 
adjustments by Steinbrück (2012), however, pose a problem regarding the prohibition of par-
ticipation. The OECD touches upon this issue by indicating, in a not very detailed manner, 
that cooperation between savings banks and regional banks will continue to be possible. 22 
                                                 
22 Landesbank Berlin serves as a good example of a holding structure in the savings bank and regional banking 
sector. Under the umbrella of LBB Holding AG, Landesbank Berlin and Berliner Sparkasse, as universal 
banks, are responsible for customer business, while LBB Invest, as a fund provider, is responsible for capital 
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Cooperation between savings banks and regional banks could be changed by Liikanen’s Ave-
nue 1. This would be the case when a financial institution crosses the thresholds, which are 
deemed to be significant for the categorisation of trading activities. According to the current 
Liikanen proposals (size of the position “assets held for trading and available for sale” ex-
ceeds 15-25% of all assets) this could apply to LBBW. Figures published by the Association 
of German Public Banks (VÖB), however, show that almost all regional banks would be af-
fected. Whether a separation of trading activities becomes reality depends on the credibility of 
the restructuring and liquidation plans to be submitted. If a prevention of spill-overs of losses 
from the investment bank to the retail unit is credible or if the responsible supervisory au-
thority uses its discretionary scope for decision, a separation is not necessary. Nevertheless, 
regional banks would still be affected by the additional non-risk-weighted capital buffer re-
quirements. These could even be higher than expected depending on the share of deposit-
funded refinancing. If trading activities remain underneath the threshold or if there is a “living 
will”, banks may continue to pursue all activities within the existing banking structures. The 
repercussions of Liikanen’s Avenue 2 for the savings bank and regional banking sector are 
similar to those of Avenue 1. But since supervisory authorities cannot always take into ac-
count national characteristics in their decisions, the Liikanen group considers certain excep-
tions for associations, which it does not describe in more detail. 
4 Conclusion for Economic Policy and Banking Regulation 
This section presents the main findings of our study. A separate banking system is not 
necessary to prevent conflicts of interest within the banks. This is the result of many empirical 
studies analysing banks’ business policy before the introduction of the Glass-Steagall Act in 
1933 against the backdrop of the separate banking system in the US which was abolished in 
the late 1990s. These studies show that there were no systemic differences between the issu-
ing activities of a universal bank and a pure investment bank. 
None of the current reform proposals calls for a complete separation of all investment 
banking functions from the universal bank. The Volcker Rule in the US aims at restricting the 
investment banking participation of banks with deposit banking. Short-term proprietary trad-
                                                                                                                                                        
market business. LBB Holding yielded an interest surplus of EUR 951 mio. in 2011, almost 3.5 times as much 
as the commission surplus (EUR 260 mio.). However, adjustments would have to be made due to the partial 
overlap in the boards of directors of holding parent and subsidiaries and concerning potential restrictions in 
operations for banks in the customer business. 
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ing and high participation in risky assets are to be prohibited. The other proposals, on the oth-
er hand, aim directly at banks’ business structures. The Vickers Commission’s proposals in 
the UK stipulate especially harsh requirements for the retail banking sector, strictly separating 
it from other banking units. The reform proposals by the OECD, Steinbrück and the Liikanen 
Group, however, focus on individual investment banking activities. According to Liikanen, 
proprietary trading with securities and derivatives and further risky activities are to be trans-
ferred to the investment bank. 
Not all proposals on separate banking systems adequately address the association struc-
tures in the public banking sector. Problems are to be expected when cooperation in an asso-
ciation is no longer permitted, which would be the case under the Vickers Commission’s pro-
posal. The Volcker Rule and the proposals on NOHC structures, on the other hand, could be 
implemented relatively well in the association of savings banks and regional banks. The 
Liikanen Group’s Avenue 1 on stabilising the banking sector would be particularly beneficial 
for public banks, as long as supervisory authorities use their scope for decision to take into 
account public banks’ needs. However, it is not clear how to take German associations into 
consideration should Avenue 2 be introduced, which entails an automatic separation of the 
entire trading business when thresholds are exceeded. 
A separate banking system reduces potential banking business diversification: A strict 
separation of investment banks from retail banks would diminish useful diversification ef-
fects, which could cause both retail banks and investment banks to become less stable. 
The separation of investment bank and retail bank as proposed by the Liikanen Report 
takes account of potential diversification benefits of the universal bank by introducing thresh-
olds. Since a separation is only recommended for a minimum participation in investment 
banking of 15 to 25%, diversification benefits could still be reached by combining a smaller 
share of investment banking with a larger share of retail banking. However, diversification 
benefits from the banking business would largely be lost, especially for the investment bank, 
should a strict separation (Avenue 2) occur. 
Alternatives for a further regulation of investment banking 
The aim of separate banking systems is to remove the highly risky investment banking 
activities from the universal bank and manage it as a separate entity. This constitutes a strong 
intervention in existing banking structures and raises the question whether the risks stemming 
from investment banking could be minimised adequately with less effort. This section pre-
17 
sents two alternatives geared towards reducing the systemic risk stemming from investment 
banks.  The general idea is to make existing23 or additional capital requirements conditional on 
the size of the investment business. Such a component of regulatory equity could be defined 
depending on the size of a bank’s participation in investment banking relative to the overall 
bank size.24 This measure could be compulsory for all banks with a certain participation in 
investment banking or, alternatively, only for systemically important banks (e.g. global sys-
temically important banks (G-SIB) or domestic systemically important banks (D-SIB)). Since 
proprietary trading constitutes a particularly risky part of investment banking, this equity re-
quirement could also be defined as dependent on the size of a bank’s proprietary trading. 
A second alternative would be to link additional regulatory equity for banks to the size 
of a bank’s hedge fund business. A good reason for this alternative is that lending to hedge 
funds is a main influencing factor for systemic risk stemming from investment banks. Contra-
ry to the Volcker Rule, this regulation would not limit the maximum participation rate but 
would stipulate capital requirements and therefore the price for lending to hedge funds.  
An advantage for banking supervision would be that banks cooperating with hedge 
funds are easier to regulate than hedge funds themselves, which in turn means that hedge 
funds could (indirectly) be regulated more easily. A disadvantage for banks would be that 
they would have to bear the burden (and costs) instead of hedge funds, which are more diffi-
cult to grasp. 
These two alternatives would avoid the effort-intensive splitting of banks, which would 
also entail unforeseeable consequences for banks’ business models. Nevertheless, these two 
approaches could set incentives to reduce investment banking participation. However, there 
already are comprehensive regulation reforms (Basel III, EU Directive on Alternative Invest-




                                                 
23 As, for example, the capital conservation buffer or the systemic buffer. 
24 As Avenue 1 of the Liikanen Report already calls for an additional minimum equity ratio based on the non-
risk-weighted investment banking activities this idea could be easily integrated in the proposal of the Liikanen 
group. 
25 DIRECTIVE 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative In-
vestment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 
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